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Abstrat
Although the problem of pensions funding cannot be reduced solely to the demographic
factor, the construction of highly sophisticated models to analyse the impact of ageing
on pension sustainability introduces problems of data availability and comparability
between EU Member States owing to the different types of pension systems existing in
each country. To overcome these obstacles, the approach used in this paper is different.
A model has been defined using some simplified assumptions, which do not provide
precise forecasts but orders of magnitude on the implications of ageing for the 25 EU
countries over the period 2000-2030. This is done by using a range of scenarios of
population and employment trends in order to assess the impact of a series of alternative
measures –like the increase of the effective average age of labour exit or the growth of
labour supply through immigration– to assure the sustainability of pension systems. The
results emphasise the importance of employment growth for Europe and in particular
the need to keep older workers at work, thereby contributing to both increased
participation and delaying retirement.
Key words: Population ageing, employment, immigration, European Union, pension
sustainability, model.
Resum:
Malgrat el problema del finançament de les pensions no pot reduir-se únicament al
factor demogràfic, la construcció de models molt sofisticats per analitzar l’impacte de
l’envelliment sobre la sostenibilitat dels sistemes de pensions genera problemes de
disponibilitat de dades i de comparabilitat entre els estats membres de la Unió Europea,
degut als diferents sistemes de pensions existents a cada país. Per superar aquests
obstacles, l’enfoc utilitzat en aquesta comunicació és diferent. Utilitzant hipòtesis
simplificades, s’ha definit un model que no proporciona projeccions precises, sinó més
aviat ordenades de magnitud respecte a les implicacions de l’envelliment en els 25
països de la UE durant el període 2004-2050. En la seva realització s’han utilitzat
diferents escenaris de població i treball, amb l’objectiu d’avaluar l’impacte d’un conjunt
de mesures alternatives –com l’augment de l’edat mitjana efectiva de sortida del mercat
laboral, o l’increment d’oferta de treballadors mitjançant la immigració- per assegurar la
sostenibilitat del sistema de pensions. Els resultats posen èmfasi en la importància del
creixement del treball i, particularment, en la necessitat de mantenir els treballadors
d’edats més avançades en el mercat laboral per així contribuir al creixement de les taxes
d’activitat i, simultàniament, al retard de l’edat efectiva de jubilació.
Paraules clau: Envelliment, treball, immigració, Unió Europea, sistemes de pensions,
model.
Resumen:
Aunque el problema de la financiación de las pensiones no puede reducirse únicamente
al factor demográfico, la construcción de modelos muy sofisticados para analizar el
impacto del envejecimiento sobre la sostenibilidad de los sistemas de pensiones crea
problemas de disponibilidad de datos y de comparabilidad entre los Estados miembros
de la Unión Europea, debido a los diferentes sistemas de pensiones existentes en cada
país. Para superar estos obstáculos, el enfoque utilizado en esta comunicación es
diferente. Utilizando hipótesis simplificadas, se ha definido un modelo que no
proporciona proyecciones precisas sino más bien órdenes de magnitud respecto a las
implicaciones del envejecimiento en los 25 países de la UE a lo largo del periodo 2004-
2050. Para ello se han utilizado diferentes escenarios de población y empleo con el
objetivo de evaluar el impacto de una serie de medidas alternativas –como el aumento
de la edad media efectiva de salida del mercado laboral, o el incremento de la oferta de
trabajadores mediante la inmigración– para asegurar la sostenibilidad de los sistemas de
pensiones. Los resultados enfatizan la importancia del crecimiento del empleo y, en
particular, la necesidad de mantener a los trabajadores de mayor edad en el mercado de
trabajo para así contribuir al crecimiento de las tasas de actividad y, simultáneamente, al
retraso de la edad efectiva de jubilación.
Palabras clave: Envejecimiento, empleo, inmigración, Unión Europea, sistemas de
pensiones, modelo.
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BUILDING A SIMPLIFIED MODEL TO ASSESS THE IMPACT OF
POPULATION AGEING, EMPLOYMENT TRENDS AND IMMIGRATION
LEVELS ON PENSION SUSTAINABILITY IN THE EU-25 MEMBER STATES1
1. Introduction: The need for a simplified model to ensure sufficient comparability
between countries
Demographic projections indicate that the ageing of the European population will
become more pronounced over the next four decades. This demographic trend will have
economic and social consequences in a number of areas with important policy
implications. For instance, population ageing has raised a great deal of interest among
policy makers in the field of pensions, in particular in relation to the future
sustainability of pension systems across the European Union. As most of the European
public pension schemes are pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems where present workers pay
the pension of current retired people, the future decrease of the working age population
and the future increase of the number of retired people is supposed to threaten the
equilibrium of pension systems.
An important indicator of the ageing process, particularly related to the sustainability of
pension systems, is the ratio of the number of retired people to the number of employed.
This is often referred to as the economic dependency ratio (EDR). At the European
Union level, the pressure on the economic dependency ratio will increase after 2010 as
the baby boom generation will start crossing the age of retirement. Consequently, the
EDR will probably keep increasing until about 2040, all other factors being constant.
The pressure of the baby boom effect on the dependency ratio will then start decreasing.
Only an important growth of the working age population due to an increase in fertility
                                                          
1 This paper is a result of the project “Demografía e integración social de la población de nacionalidad
extranjera en España (SEJ 2004-00846), funded by the R+D+I National Plan of the Spanish Ministery of
Education and Science.
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levels or, more probably, a continuous inflow of (young) immigrants could help to
compensate the tendency to ageing.
However, an examination of the financial sustainability of pension systems can not be
limited to the sole effect of demographic factors. It needs to take into account other
factors also playing a major role in funding pensions, such as the employment level, the
economic performance in terms of productivity (GDP per employed person), and the
main characteristics of the pensions systems in relation to the level of contributions and
the relative level of pensions.
At national level, a considerable amount of research has already been devoted to
examine the sustainability of pension systems, notably by measuring the ageing impact.
Many sophisticated models for pension forecasting already exist in the majority of the
European Union Member States taking due account of the specificities of national
pension systems. Nevertheless, it is very difficult to make comparisons between
countries owing to the differences in the models used in terms of their structures and
basic assumptions and of course the different types of pension systems existing across
Member States2. Several attempts have also been made in the past to provide a common
framework at European level from the analytical models used in the different countries.
However, their complexity and lack of comparability at national level limit the use of
their results.
A suggestive way to overcome this obstacle, used in this paper, is to define a model
using simplified assumptions, which does not intend to give precise pension expenditure
forecasts, but rather assess the demographic effect of ageing on the balance between
contributions and benefits, keeping all other factors unchanged. At the same time, the
model sheds light on the implications of a range of demographic and economic
measures that could be used to assure the financial sustainability of pension systems.
                                                          
2 D. Franco and T. Munzi present a survey of national estimates and models in "Public pension
expenditure prospects in the European Union: A survey of national projections", in European Economy,
No. 3, 1996, Ageing and Pension expenditure prospects in the Western World, pp.1-126.  See also:
"Ageing and fiscal policies in the European Union", in European Economy N°4 1997, The Welfare State
in Europe - Challenges and reforms, pp.239-388.
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2. Presentation of the broad framework of the model
The model presented in this paper improves and extends up to 2050 and for the 10 new
Member States the one used by the European Commission, Directorate-General of
Employment and Social Affairs, in the internal working paper “Pension Sustainability,
Ageing and Labour Supply”3 (Gil, Math, 2000). I developed that model, at a macro-
economic level, on the basis of the previous one proposed by G. Calot et al. in “Le
vieillissement démographique dans l'Union Européenne à l'horizon 2050. Étude
d'impact du viellissement démographique” (study financed by DG Employment and
Social Affairs, European Commission). All these models integrate the key elements
necessary to assess the funding sustainability and are based on the same principle: a
PAYG system is in an equilibrium situation when there is a balance between the total
contribution to pensions and the total benefits received by retired people. If the number
of retirees increases due to ageing, the volume of pensions will increase and the system
will be put into difficulties unless the other variables of the model change to recover the
initial financial equilibrium.
The model uses demographic projections for the period 2004-2050 to foresee the future
evolution of retired people: this is the initial input of the model4. The implication of
ageing on the balance of contributions and benefits (keeping all other factors
unchanged) is therefore examined, as well as the required change(s) in terms of the
other key factors, to ensure an equilibrium between the total contributions to pensions
and the total benefits received during the analysed period. These compensatory
measures are the outputs of the model.
In this way, the model provides an insight on how the implications of ageing on pension
systems may be compensated by examining possible evolutions (separately or together)
of other key factors such as: increasing the effective retirement age (which primarily
leads to a lower number of retirees and therefore expenditure, and may secondarily
                                                          
3 This paper was written by the author with the key contribution of Antoine Math and the collaboration of
Costas Fotakis, Edit Corominas and James Battye. I would like to express them my gratitude.
4 Other alternative inputs can be also used to analyse, for instance, which are the implications of a change
in the number of employed people, or in the share of GDP to finance pensions, or in the level of the
average pension. As this paper is mainly interested in the implications of ageing, the other measures are
only considered as outputs to rebalance the system.
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increase the number of employed people and consequently the total contributions),
decreasing the pension levels (and thus the expenditure), increasing the number of
people at work and their productivity (which both imply an increase in total
contributions), and increasing their average contributions to the pension system.
3. Formal description of the model
At the macroeconomic level, the funding of pensions is a question of redistribution of
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from those who are participating in economic life to
those who are in retirement. A pension system can be described as in equilibrium when
the volume of contributions levied on workers equals the amount of pensions paid to
retired people.
(1) Volume of contributions     =     volume of pensions
or
(2) GDP   x  c      =     R  x  p
where
• GDP = the wealth produced (gross domestic product).
• c = the share of gross domestic product necessary to finance pensions,
comprising all forms of contribution to the system, i.e. employers and
employees contributions, taxes and other contributions5.
• R = the number of retired people.
• p = the average pension.
(2) is equivalent to
(3) E  x GDP/E  x  c       =      R x t x GDP/E
                                                          
5 This broad definition of "c" is resulting from the underlying assumption that people in employment are
the only producers and contributors within the system and hence there is no difference between systems
financed more through taxation and systems financed more through social contributions.
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where:
• E = the number of people in employment (in full-time equivalents), i.e. the
people that produces the GDP from what the pensions are financed.
• GDP/E = the average gross domestic product per employed person (GDP
divided by the number of people in work).
• t = the “transfer ratio” or ratio of average pension to average gross domestic
product per employed person (t = p / (GDP/E))6.
As the number of retired people (R), the number of people in employment (E) and the
weight of contributions in percentage of GDP (c) is known for a particular year, t can be
estimated by assuming the equilibrium between expenditure and receipts.
(4) t  =  E/R  x  c.
In this model, pension sustainability is achieved when the total resource equals the total
expenditure at the macroeconomic level during the considered period (in this case,
2004-2050). Within this framework, it is not relevant whether the schemes are based on
a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system or on funded schemes7.
4. Assumptions in relation to the variables and data used in the model
• Pension schemes are assumed to be in financial equilibrium in the starting year
(2004). Therefore all findings should be related to this starting year as the point of
reference.
• The only external shock unbalancing the system is assumed to be the change in the
number of retired people due to population ageing.
                                                          
6 This is different that the net replacement rate which is the ratio of average pension to average wage.
7 The problem of redistribution of GDP at macro level between those in work and those who are retired is
the same for PAYG and funded schemes, since there is no escaping the fact that current GDP is shared
every year between those who receive income directly from their participation in economic life and those
who do not. If there are more elderly retired people, the share of pensions in GDP is likely to be greater,
whatever the funding base of the pensions, contributions, taxes or financial yields.
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• Data on population by age for the period 2000-2050 are taken from Eurostat
demographic scenarios (last revision in 2005). Three different scenarios are used:
baseline, low, and high variants.
• E, the number of people in employment and contributing to the system, is calculated
by using the full-time equivalent (FTE) rate of employment. Indeed, taking the FTE
rate provides a better and more comparable insight, between countries and over
time, of the ability of employed people to create wealth and to contribute to the
funding of pension systems8.
• c, the share of GDP levied to finance pensions, is estimated by the total expenditure
on old age and survivors' benefits as a percentage of GDP, as given by Eurostat
ESSPROS database9.
• R, the retired population, is assumed to be the part of the population above the
average effective retirement age (“era”). This assumption is acceptable as most of
the older people actually have direct or derivative rights to pensions. The average
effective retirement age has been estimated for each country by Eurostat from the
Labour Force Survey data on age-specific activity rates.
• t, the transfer ratio, is equal to E/R x c when the system is in equilibrium (see
equation 4). “t” provides a proxy measure to assess the evolution of the relative
level of pension.
The values of the parameters of the model in 2004 for the 25 Member States, as well as
for EU15 and EU25, can be seen in Table 1. This table also shows the figures for related
indicators such as the economic dependency ratio, the employment rate and the average
                                                          
8 Part-time workers contribute less than full time ones regardless of the type of pension system funding:
directly through social contributions (since those are mostly more or less proportional to earnings), or
indirectly through general taxation. Furthermore, taking FTE enables a more reliable comparison between
countries, given the wide dispersion within the Union in relation to the prevalence and average duration
of part-time employment.
9 The ESSPROS (European System of Social Protection Statistics) database on social protection
expenditure and receipts has been compiled by Eurostat on a new system of classification since 1997. The
database is designed to provide a comparable indication of the scale of expenditure and receipts in
different EU countries as well as of developments over time. Presently, it is the most reliable and
homogenised source of data about social protection in the European Union, although some problems of
comparison between Member States remain, especially in relation to the division of spending between
functions.
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effective retirement age –which is significantly lower than the “legal” retirement age in
most countries.
Table 1. Main parameters of the model in 2004 in the EU Member States and in EU-15 and EU-25
R E c t EDR (%) er era wap
Belgium 2434281 3679000 0,11 0,17 66,2 54 58,7 6818862
Czech Republic 1971225 4526500 0,08 0,19 43,5 63 60 7233788
Denmark 978445 2399500 0,11 0,27 40,8 67 62,1 3575484
Germany 18583984 31194500 0,13 0,21 59,6 56 61,6 55509566
Estonia 280830 553000 0,06 0,12 50,8 60 60,8 916480
Greece 2172162 4155000 0,13 0,25 52,3 56 63,2 7472057
Spain 8568028 16213000 0,09 0,17 52,8 56 61,4 29050463
France 12709000 22126500 0,13 0,22 57,4 57 59,6 38969032
Ireland 468665 1651500 0,04 0,13 28,4 60 64,4 2737975
Italy 13815840 20699000 0,16 0,23 66,7 54 61 38549342
Cyprus 103498 314500 0,12 0,37 32,9 63 62,5 497346
Latvia 505165 938500 0,08 0,15 53,8 59 60,3 1587310
Lithuania 579222 1356500 0,07 0,16 42,7 58 63,3 2319179
Luxembourg 88087 169500 0,08 0,16 52,0 56 59,3 303165
Hungary 1947167 3785500 0,09 0,17 51,4 55 61,6 6943535
Malta 76679 139500 0,09 0,17 55,0 51 58,8 274860
Netherlands 2983093 6195000 0,11 0,23 48,2 56 60,4 10991174
Austria 1878773 3368500 0,14 0,25 55,8 61 58,8 5530619
Poland 7326275 12779000 0,12 0,21 57,3 48 58 26659118
Portugal 2072906 4613500 0,10 0,23 44,9 65 62,1 7064293
Slovenia 490973 885500 0,12 0,21 55,4 63 56,2 1404768
Slovakia 977618 2114000 0,07 0,16 46,2 55 57,8 3815286
Finland 1066894 2215000 0,09 0,20 48,2 64 60,3 3486440
Sweden 1733562 3743000 0,12 0,27 46,3 64 63,1 5835426
United Kingdom 10735776 23898000 0,12 0,27 44,9 61 63 39217962
EU 15 79977373 145923500 0,12 0,22 54,8 57 61,4 255111860
EU 25 94485336 173317500 0,12 0,22 54,5 56 61 306763530
Source: Eurostat database
Definitions:
R retired persons (people over average effective retirement age). Source: own calculation
E employed people in full-time equivalents. Source: Eurostat Labour Force Survey
c expenditure (% of GDP) in old age and survivors pensions. Source: Eurostat ESSPROS database, 2002 or more recent available data
t transfer ratio calculated in order to ensure equality in formula (1)
EDR Economic Dependency Ratio (number of retired persons by 100 employed people) 
er employment rate (employed persons / working age population) in full-time equivalents
era average effective retirement age. Source: Eurostat
wap working age population (persons aged 15-64 years old). Source: Eurostat
Table 1 shows a wide range of “starting” positions in 2004 in relation to the different
parameters:
• Parameter “c”, that has remained quite stable in the Union at around 12% in the last
years, varies widely between countries, from just 4% in Ireland to around 16% in
Italy (last figures available).
• The transfer ratio is significantly below the European average in Ireland and
Estonia, and relatively high in Cyprus, Denmark, Sweden and the UK.
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• The lowest economic dependency ratio can be found in Ireland and the highest in
Italy, while employment rates varies between Poland (48%) and Denmark (67%).
• Finally, in Ireland the average effective retirement age is already above 64 years,
whereas in Belgium, Malta, Austria and Poland it is just below 59.
5. Different measures to compensate the impact of ageing
In a first step, the model examines the impact of ageing and more specifically the
growth of the number of retired people, R10, on the equilibrium between expenditure
and receipts during the period between 2000 and 2050, all other key factors remaining
constant. The model’s outputs show magnitude of the changes needed in the different
key factors to maintain the system in equilibrium, and thereby counteract the effect of
ageing. These compensatory changes are examined one by one (approach ceteris
paribus) to assess the individual compensatory effect to ageing that each key factor
could play, for instance by:
• Increasing the number of employed persons (E’) to compensate for the growth of
retired people –secondarily, the number of required immigrants is estimated by
comparing E’ and the projected activity levels applied to the projected working age
population;
• Increasing the effective retirement age (era): this results in a decrease of the number
of retired (R) and secondarily in an increase of the number of potential contributors;
• Increasing the share of GDP to finance pensions (c), by increasing social
contributions and/or taxes;
• Decreasing the transfer ratio (t), by making the average pension increase by a
smaller percentage than the GDP per employed person (productivity) 11.
                                                          
10 The exact number of retired people is determined by the value of “era” (that in this first exercise is
constant between 2004 and 2050) and the variation of the age structure determined by Eurostat baseline
scenario.
11 The evolution of t reflects the evolution of the relative level of the average pension (t = p / (GDP/E), so
decreasing t may be the result of a relative increase of the GDP per employed person (i.e., an increase of
productivity), or of a relative decrease of the average absolute pension (p). Therefore, maintaining the
9
The magnitude of these compensatory actions required to re-balance the European
countries’ pension systems are shown in Table 2. The variation in these parameters
between Member States reflect, to some extent, the margins of manoeuvre and
flexibility that each country has to address the impact of ageing on pension systems.
In a second step, different future values for the key factors are also introduced in the
model as inputs, establishing different prospective scenarios combining changes in three
key factors:
• modifying the demographic scenario and therefore the number of retired people (R)
or in the working age population (wap);
• increasing the number of employed people (E); and
• increasing the effective retirement age (era);
In this final exercise, the number of employed people (E) is transformed from an output
into an input to show how significant employment growth (and consequently
immigration levels) in the next years could be in alleviating the imbalances brought
about by ageing. In the same way, the impact of an increase in the effective retirement
age up to 70 years old is analysed as well as the consequences of changes in the
demographic scenarios (from baseline to high and low variants).
6. Results
Table 2 shows the compensatory changes in the key factors (approach ceteris paribus)
for the simplest scenario, where the only change is the number of retired people (R) due
to ageing. Since the assumptions used have a necessary element of arbitrariness, the
results shown in table 2 must be treated with a degree of caution. They do not provide
projections but rather illustrations of the roles played by the different factors on the
sustainability of pension systems.
                                                                                                                                                                         
relative level of average pension implies that the absolute level of average pension (p) should evolve at
the same pace as the productivity.
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Table 2. Compensatory actions (ceteris paribus) maintaining the equilibrium of contributions and pensions in 2050
R' EDR' (%) E' Eg (%) er' (%) immigr cera ct cp (%) c'
Belgium 3835249 104,2 5796324 0,99 92 1082767 11,0 0,63 -36,5 0,18
Czech Republic 3385385 74,8 7773818 1,18 155 4006775 10,9 0,58 -41,8 0,14
Denmark 1484811 61,9 3641292 0,91 111 1188127 8,9 0,66 -34,1 0,17
Germany 26982810 86,5 45292509 0,81 107 13638471 8,6 0,69 -31,1 0,18
Estonia 363580 65,7 715948 0,56 107 213095 4,7 0,77 -22,8 0,08
Greece 3547060 85,4 6784961 1,07 116 2382264 9,8 0,61 -38,8 0,21
Spain 17139610 105,7 32432725 1,52 143 15450001 13,8 0,50 -50,0 0,18
France 21990858 99,4 38286310 1,20 102 10217125 12,7 0,58 -42,2 0,22
Ireland 1474320 89,3 5195266 2,52 164 2820466 15,1 0,32 -68,2 0,11
Italy 21157002 102,2 31697587 0,93 112 10546556 10,8 0,65 -34,7 0,24
Cyprus 290990 92,5 884233 2,27 150 441440 15,0 0,36 -64,4 0,34
Latvia 628053 66,9 1166802 0,47 105 336035 4,1 0,80 -19,6 0,10
Lithuania 846840 62,4 1983244 0,83 116 695798 6,6 0,68 -31,6 0,10
Luxembourg 182619 107,7 351402 1,60 89 56208 14,6 0,48 -51,8 0,17
Hungary 2905177 76,7 5647973 0,87 109 1761608 8,2 0,67 -33,0 0,13
Malta 168351 120,7 306276 1,72 99 74650 13,7 0,46 -54,5 0,20
Netherlands 5006242 80,8 10396481 1,13 98 2470209 10,7 0,60 -40,4 0,18
Austria 3159396 93,8 5664562 1,14 120 2135977 12,3 0,59 -40,5 0,24
Poland 13456973 105,3 23472591 1,33 121 8923659 11,6 0,54 -45,6 0,22
Portugal 3550481 77,0 7902020 1,18 144 3775490 10,7 0,58 -41,6 0,17
Slovenia 810589 91,5 1461947 1,10 137 663243 12,4 0,61 -39,4 0,19
Slovakia 1916695 90,7 4144659 1,47 151 2089109 12,6 0,51 -49,0 0,14
Finland 1701066 76,8 3531617 1,02 117 1271380 10,1 0,63 -37,3 0,15
Sweden 2713658 72,5 5859163 0,98 97 1314483 8,9 0,64 -36,1 0,19
United Kingdom 18770343 78,5 41783068 1,22 111 13459506 10,9 0,57 -42,8 0,22
EU 15 132626240 90,9 241984506 1,11 111 79178250 11,1 0,60 -39,7 0,20
EU 25 157521468 90,9 288946711 1,12 113 97788373 11,0 0,60 -40,0 0,20
Definitions:
R' retired persons (people over average effective retirement age) in 2050 determined by Eurostat baseline scenario
EDR' Economic Dependency Ratio (number of retired persons by 100 employed people) in 2050
E' employed people in full-time equivalents maintaining the system in equilibrium in 2050
Eg annual employment growth between 2004 and 2050 maintaining the system in equilibrium
er' employment rate (employed persons / working age population) in full-time equivalents in 2050
immigr number of immigrants needed between 2004 and 2050 maintaining the system inequilibrium 
cera change in average effective retirement age between 2004 and 2050 maintaining the system in equilibrium
ct coefficient multiplying 2004 transfer ratios maintaining the system in equilibrium in 2050
cp change in average pension between 2004 and 2050 maintaining the system in equilibrium
c' expenditure (% of GDP) in old age and survivors pensions maintaining the system en equilibrium
6.1. Considerations at EU-25 level (I): The magnitude of changes to counteract
ageing
Under the assumptions of the baseline scenario12 and a constant effective retirement age
of 61 years, the number of retired people in the whole European Union will pass from
94.5 millions in 2004 (Table 1) to 157.5 millions in 2050 (Table 2, first column). It
means that the EDR will increase from 54.5 to 90.9 retired persons per 100 employed
persons in 2050 (ceteris paribus, i.e. if employment level is constant), a very significant
increase that would put pension systems under pressure.
The results in the other columns of Table 2 show the alternative compensating changes
required by each key factor to counteract the sole impact of ageing for the period ending
in 2050. The most important outcome is that the employment growth required to
counteract ageing is 1.12% p.a., meaning an increase from 173 to 289 millions of
employees (in full-time equivalents). In other terms, this is somewhat less than the
11
average employment growth that the EU requires between 2000 and 2010 in order to
fulfil the Lisbon targets (estimated at around 1.2% p.a.), except here it is assumed to be
maintained until 2050. The resulting employment rate in 2050 (113%) means that the
regressive evolution of the working age population will suppose a limitation in
achieving the required employment level to compensate ageing: in Graph 1 the change
between 2004-2050 in retired people and the number of employees maintaining the
pension system in equilibrium is compared to the size of the working age population.
Graph 1. Change in working age population (wap), retired (R) and 
employed maintaining the system in equilibrium (E') if effective 
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If we consider that an employment rate of 75% (in full-time equivalents) is a plausible
limit of employability for the European Union –this is even higher that the level existing
in the EU country with the highest employment rate, Denmark– then a deficit of
workforce will exist from around 2022 onwards.
The magnitude of the employment growth required to compensate ageing is so
important that the role of immigration is emphasised. Let’s estimate the number of
required immigrants as the difference between E’ (total employment in full-time
equivalents maintaining the system in equilibrium) and a level of 75% of the working
age population projected by the baseline scenario. In that case, almost 98 million
                                                                                                                                                                         
12 Baseline scenario is characterised by a moderate increase in fertility and life expectancy level across the
analysed period, together with an annual net migration level of around 0.8 million immigrants up to 2050.
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immigrants will be required; the figure would really be around the double, as the current
activity rate of immigrants is 61.3% (Eurostat LFS data, 2002) and the number of
immigrants outside the working age should also be taken into account. We should also
addition around 36 million immigrants between 2004 and 2050 inside the baseline
scenario (which implies an annual average of around 0.8 million immigrants) resulting
in almost 230 million immigrants during the whole period considered, i.e. an entry of
more than 5 million of net migrants in a yearly basis up to 2050 (in 2003, last year with
available data, the entry of immigrants was estimated in around 2 million).
This scenario shows that neither employment growth alone nor complemented with
immigration will be able to counteract ageing at EU level: the required employment
creation and the level of immigrants needed are clearly not sustainable during a period
of 45 years.
The other alternative measures to compensate the effects of ageing are the following:
• The average effective retirement age, which is estimated at around 61 years old in
2004 at EU-25 level, should increase 11 years by 2050 (so reaching a level of 72
years) in order to maintain the model in equilibrium –by fixing the number of retired
people in 94.5 millions like in 2004, all the other parameters remaining equal. It is
without doubt an important increase, but not very different from growth in life
expectancy since 1960, at a pace of 2 additional years per decade. A policy
framework which promotes employment growth, but at the same time encourages
people to remain in work longer and subsequently improve the employability of
older workers is therefore required.
• The transfer ratio (t) should be multiplied by 0.6 (coefficient ct, Table 2), that is,
decreasing the average pension by 40% (coefficient cp, Table 2) which means
making productivity grow more quickly than pension absolute levels between 2004
and 2050.
• Finally, the GDP contribution to pensions (c) should increase from 12% in 2004 to
20% in 2050 (column c’, Table 2), a 66.7% increase across the studied period.
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Of course, these changes required to ensure sustainability have to be seen as extreme
values since the real evolutions are likely to be a mix of changes in all the factors. For
instance, a future decrease in transfer ratios and a growth in “era” should be taken for
granted given the measures already taken in most Member States to limit pension
growth which will lead, if unchanged, to a decrease of the relative pension levels and an
increase in the effective retirement age.
6.2. Considerations at EU-25 level (II): The impact of changes in key compensatory
measures
In the second phase of the analysis, the parameters of the equation (3) are modified,
first, and combined, then, to check the feasibility of measures compensating ageing.
This exercise has been done for all the Member States and EU-15, although only the
results for EU-25 are presented here.
• modifying the demographic scenario;
If Eurostat baseline demographic scenario is replaced by high or low variants, the
number of persons in retirement (R) or in the working age population (wap) is therefore
modified. As the high scenario implies higher fertility but also higher life expectancy,
both R’ and E’ are higher than in the baseline scenario: 171 and 314 millions,
respectively. The resulting economic dependency ratio (EDR) is even worst than in the
baseline scenario: 98.8% compared to 90.9%.The opposite trends (with lower fertility
and lower life expectancy) appear in the low scenario, where R’ = 146 millions and E’ =
268 millions, resulting in a EDR of 84.2%. It appears that a modification in
demographic trends does not produce important changes and ageing will be an
unavoidable trend in the next four decades.
• increasing the number of people in employment (E);
An annual employment growth of 1.2% would result in a decrease of the EDR from
54.5% in 2004 to 52.5% in 2050, but the employment rate (in full-time equivalents)
would achieve a level as high as 118% !
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More realistic seems an average employment growth of 0.6% p.a. during the studied
period: in that case, the EDR would experience a moderate increase, up to 69 retired per
100 employed persons, although the resulting employment rate, 90% is still very high.
Finally, a 0.3% annual employment growth would result in a more feasible 78%
employment rate combined with an EDR of 79.2. What the model shows is that an
increase in employment is an important measure to assure pension system sustainability,
but the size of the potential workforce (the working age population) limits the capacity
of growth of the number of people in employment. Therefore, it has to be combined
with additional measures like an increase in the age of exit of the labour market.
• increasing the effective retirement age (era);
If the “era” is delayed from the current 61 years to 65 in 2050, the EDR would move
from its present level of 54.5 retired per 100 employed, to 77.6. It’s an important level,
but much lower than the resulting 90.9 if the average exit age remains unchanged. Much
better is the resulting EDR (61%) if “era” in delayed up to 70 years in 2050: we have
however to recognise that it is not easy to obtain such a significant delay in retirement
age even in a context of growing life expectancy.
More realistic seems to combine different measures in order to avoid financial
deterioration of pension systems: for instance, employment growth with delaying
retirement age. Indeed, the higher the increase in effective retirement age, the lower the
employment growth needed to maintain the equilibrium. Or the other way around, the
higher the growth in employment, the lower the increase in effective retirement age
needed to compensate ageing.
If an average 0.3% employment growth p.a. is combined with a delay in the “era” of 5
years, until 66 years, then R’ and E’ would result, respectively, in 129 million and 198
million persons in 2050, with a resulting EDR of 64.7%, which seems a plausible level
(EDR is currently higher in Belgium and Italy, see Table 1). The resulting employment
rate in full-time equivalents, 78%, is still high, but the deficit of workforce can be
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compensated with a very moderate level of immigration: only 8 million of additional
immigrants (or around 16 million including inactive immigrants) between 2004 and
2050.
In this context, the system equilibrium can be achieved, if GDP contribution to pensions
(c) is constant (12%), through a limited decrease (-16%) in transfer ratio. Or what it is
the same, a feasible increase of productivity (GDP/employee) of 19% in a period of 45
years. But if we decide that the transfer ratio should remain constant, then is “c” what
has to be experience a 19% increase, resulting in an expenditure in pensions (expressed
as a percentage of GDP) of 14% in 2050, similar to the current level in Austria and
lower than the share presently existing in Italy (see Table 1).
The results demonstrate that the longer term sustainability of pension systems appears
to be a challenge that can be overcome only if the European Union achieves high, but
nonetheless feasible, levels of employment growth over the next decades, combined
with other complementary measures. However, owing to differences between the ageing
process and other relevant factors across Member States, some compensatory measures
may be more appropriate for some countries than others.
6.3. Considerations at national level
When looking at national outcomes from the model (Table 2), more caution should be
taken in interpreting the results as the model does not take on board the particular
features of each national system. The following are the main findings:
• None of the Member States can expect to escape the trend of an ageing population.
The baby boomers will arrive at retirement age and despite national differences in
fertility rates, the younger cohorts entering the labour market will be unable to
compensate the number of older people entering retirement schemes.
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• The common trend towards ageing will present important differences in terms of
timing and intensity of the process for each Member State. Table 2 shows the
national impact of ageing, if all other factors, including current employment rates,
remain unchanged (initial scenario). In this case, Ireland, Cyprus, Luxembourg,
Malta and Spain will face the highest pressure in terms of compensation for the
impact of ageing on pension schemes. On the contrary, the three Baltic States and
Hungary will be the least affected by changes in dependency between 2004 and
2050.
• Differences in the ageing process between Member States will clearly have an
impact upon the appropriate policy options. In addition, there are significant
differences in the current levels of the different key factors (Table 1 shows the
actual values for some of the relevant parameters at national level). Therefore,
measures to preserve the financial equilibrium will not have the same impact in each
Member State.
• Aside from their potential impact, some measures are difficult to apply in some
Member States, owing to the current levels of the parameters, but are more
appropriate for others (see Table 1). In Member States like Ireland, Sweden, Greece
and Cyprus, where the “era” is currently delayed, an additional increase in the
average effective retirement age could be more difficult to implement than in other
countries like Slovenia, Slovakia or Belgium, where the exit of the labour market is,
on average, at younger ages; hence, other measures may need to be taken in the
former group of countries. Similarly, in countries with current high employment
rates like Denmark, Finland or Sweden, it seems more difficult to consider job
creation as the key compensatory measure than in Poland, Malta, Italy or Belgium,
with low employment levels. Whereas a decrease in the transfer ratio could have
significant stabilising effects in some Nordic countries (in Denmark and Sweden the
actual level of pension in relation to GDP per employee presents some margins for
manoeuvre), the lower share of GDP to finance pensions in Ireland shows that an
increase of “c” is a possible measure to be used by this country to maintain
equilibrium. Finally, an additional means to stabilise the system may be to increase
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the number of employed people through migration, in particular for those Member
States like Spain where the margins of manoeuvre of other measures are already
rather tight due to the intensity of ageing.
7. Conclusions
The model shows that the impact of ageing on the sustainability of pension systems
over the next 45 years is significant at EU level and for the 25 Member States. This
challenge can be overcome through a combination of different policies regarding
employment, retirement age, economic productivity and level of pensions. This question
has been assumed by European policy-makers, as there is significant pressure across the
European Union to increase labour market participation, through a delay in the average
retirement age, and employment level, and this should help financing pensions in the
future. Such a policy implies that early exits from the labour market should not remain
as high as they are today. A policy framework is therefore required which promotes
employment growth, but at the same time encourages people to remain in work longer
and subsequently improve the employability of older workers.
The model shows the existence of a wide range of national situations in terms of the
appropriate policy measures required in each Member State to maintain the equilibrium
of the pension systems. This is due to differences in timing and intensity of ageing
process but also to the diverse initial levels of the main factors affecting pension
sustainability across Member States: employment rates, transfer ratios (and relative
pension levels), and GDP share to finance pensions.
Therefore, the pension challenge is different for each Member State. Those with a high
average effective retirement age and high employment rates may need to adjust the
GDP contribution and pension levels in order to compensate for the ageing impact.
Their margins of manoeuvre appear somewhat smaller than other countries with lower
labour market participation and earlier exit from activity: these countries appear to have
more scope for adjustments by increasing the average effective retirement age and the
employment rates. Finally, immigration seems a complementary resource when all the
18
other compensatory measures are difficult to implement or are not sufficient due to the
magnitude of ageing.
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APPENDIX
ABBREVIATION
BE   Belgium
CZ   Czech Republic
DK   Denmark
DE   Federal Republic of Germany
EE   Estonia
GR   Greece
ES   Spain
FR   France
IE   Ireland
IT   Italy
CY   Cyprus
LV   Latvia
LT   Lithuania
LU   Luxembourg
HU   Hungary
MT   Malta
NL   Netherlands
AT   Austria
PL   Poland
PT   Portugal
SI   Slovenia
SK   Slovakia
FI   Finland
SE   Sweden
UK   United Kingdom
EUR25
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